Bangladesh Liberation War and Indian Left
Santanu Dey
On April 2, under the leadership of Jyoti Basu, a 21-member Bangladesh Solidarity and Aid Committee was formed. The appeal of this committee resonated not only with the people of West Bengal but across India. In response, people from all walks of life contributed whatever they could—goods, medicines, and financial aid—sending their donations to the committee’s office. From April 8 to 12, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) held a meeting in Kolkata. On April 25, the Central Committee declared a nationwide Bangladesh Solidarity Day, calling for financial contributions to be sent to the Bangladesh Solidarity and Aid Committee. P. Sundaryya, speaking in the parliament, called on the Indian Government to assist the nascent liberation struggle of the Bengali masses.
At Jyoti Basu’s request, Lakshmi Sahgal, leader of the Jhansi Brigade of Subhas Chandra Bose’s Indian National Army, and “the revolutionary daughter of Chittagong” Kalpana Dutta (Joshi) took to the streets of Delhi to raise relief funds. On April 18, at a meeting at Delhi’s Vitthalbhai Patel House, Jyoti Basu declared, “The Government of India must immediately recognize the Government of Bangladesh. They must provide weapons and all necessary support. If the Indian government fails to act, there will be severe consequences.”
The way the people of Bangladesh have fought to free themselves from West Pakistan’s oppression is unparalleled in the world’s history. I feel proud of Bangladesh’s freedom fighters. As an old man, powerless and frail, I regret that I cannot join their liberation forces, but I would have if I had the strength.
– Muzaffar Ahmed
Veteran leader of India’s communist movement, Muzaffar Ahmed, said, “The way the people of Bangladesh have fought to free themselves from West Pakistan’s oppression is unparalleled in the world’s history. I feel proud of Bangladesh’s freedom fighters. As an old man, powerless and frail, I regret that I cannot join their liberation forces, but I would have if I had the strength.” At the time, Muzaffar Ahmed was 82 years old.
In April, a delegation of CPI(M) Members of Parliament, led by Politburo member and leader of the CPI(M) group in the Lok Sabha, A.K. Gopalan, met with Indira Gandhi to demand recognition of the Government of Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi reportedly countered by asking, “Where is the government in Bangladesh? Whom should we recognize?”
On April 10, members of the National Assembly and Provincial Assembly of Bangladesh met at Agartala Circuit House. In Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s absence (he was imprisoned in West Pakistan), they decided to form a provisional government, appointing Syed Nazrul Islam as Acting President and Tajuddin Ahmad as Prime Minister. However, this decision was not announced in Agartala. On April 14, in a liberated area within Bangladesh, the provisional government was formally sworn in. Upon this news, processions led by CPI(M) erupted in Kolkata and Agartala.
On June 1-2, in utmost secrecy, leaders of various leftist parties, armed communist factions, and mass organizations met at a school in Kolkata’s Beleghata. CPI(M) oversaw all logistical arrangements, including food and security, for the meeting. At the time, the Indian government remained skeptical of the leftists’ role in the liberation war and kept them under surveillance. Meanwhile, the Naxalites, who described the liberation war as a “fight between two dogs,” had adopted an anti-liberation stance. Although Maulana Bhashani could not attend the meeting, he was named convener of the newly formed National Liberation War Coordination Committee. The committee resolved to support the exiled Government of Bangladesh while independently continuing its fight against Pakistan. This coordination committee included key organizations such as NAP (Bhashani) and the Communist Revolutionaries of East Bengal, led by Rashed Khan Menon and Haider Akbar Khan Rono, which then operated 14 armed bases across the country.
During this time, parties like the Jana Sangh (today’s BJP) pressured the Indian government for military intervention in Pakistan. On June 16, CPI(M)’s Politburo issued a statement cautioning that any armed intervention by India would transform the democratic movement in Bangladesh into an Indo-Pak conflict. This, the Politburo argued, was precisely what Yahya Khan’s military junta and its supporters desired, which would be catastrophic for Bangladesh’s resistance.
CPI(M) provided an impartial analysis of the roles played by China and the Soviet Union. Since its formation in 1964, CPI(M) had no fraternal ties with the Communist Parties of China or the Soviet Union, as it adhered independently to Marxist-Leninist ideology. By 1971, its only friendly relations were with Vietnam, with whom it engaged in multiple discussions on Bangladesh’s liberation struggle.
China held two primary positions on Bangladesh’s independence: (1) the independence movement was orchestrated by the Indian government, and (2) the issue was an internal matter of Pakistan. In response, CPI(M) stated that China’s stance was not only incorrect but also untruthful, inconsistent with past experiences, and contradictory to the international duties of the working class.
Simultaneously, the party criticized the Indo-Soviet joint statement issued in late September, which hinted at resolving Bangladesh’s issues within the framework of Pakistan. The Politburo declared, “Given the fierce resistance of Bangladesh’s people against tyranny, the guerrillas’ heroic struggles against massive odds, and the growing unity and determination of Bangladesh’s people for independence, the Indo-Soviet statement is deeply disappointing.” However, the party also acknowledged and supported the Soviet Union’s constructive role.
Meanwhile, the United States called for sending observers to the India-Bangladesh border through the United Nations. CPI(M) warned that this was a conspiracy aimed at aiding Yahya Khan’s regime and undermining Bangladesh’s liberation movement.
On December 4, 1971, Pakistan’s military junta formally declared war against India. That day, in a statement, Jyoti Basu urged the people of India to defend the country and its territories against Pakistani aggression. CPI(M) General Secretary P. Sundarayya issued another statement, calling for resisting Pakistan’s attack while supporting Bangladesh’s struggle.
Finally, on December 6, the Indian government recognized Bangladesh. CPI(M)’s Politburo convened an emergency meeting to welcome this decision. On December 16, the joint command of the Mukti Bahini and Indian Armed Forces secured the surrender of Pakistani troops. The Politburo celebrated this as a victory for the people of Bangladesh against the occupation regime.
Reflecting on the delay in granting recognition, West Bengal’s CPI(M) Secretary Promode Dasgupta wrote, “On March 29, we demanded that the Government of India recognize Bangladesh and provide full assistance, including arms. At the time, Indira Gandhi’s government questioned—whom should we recognize? Where is the government? Whom should we arm? Had Indira Gandhi accepted our demands back then, 9 million refugees wouldn’t have had to come to India, and 10 million people in Bangladesh wouldn’t have sacrificed their lives. This government took eight months to recognize Bangladesh and understand the significance of its struggle.